Saturday, November 19, 2011

An Argument Against the Existence of God

I found this on atheist John Loftus' Blog (which is here) that hasn't apparently been commented on for some time so I thought I would post it here and my response.

Consider this deductive argument from Richard R. La Croix: “If God is the greatest possible good then if God had not created there would be nothing but the greatest possible good. And since God didn’t need to create at all, then the fact that he did create produced less than the greatest possible good.” “Perhaps God could not, for some perfectly plausible reason, create a world without evil, but then it would seem that he ought not to have created at all.” “Prior to creation God knew that if he created there would be evil, so being wholly good he ought not to have created.” [The Impossibility of God, pp.119-124]. After analyzing La Croix’s argument, A.M. Weisberger argued that “contrary to popular theistic opinion, the logical form of the argument is still alive and beating.” [Suffering Belief, 1999, p. 39].


"God is the greatest possible good." There is a problem with the way that is being interpreted. What that should say is that God is the greatest possible good being. That is like saying a circle is of the greatest possible roundness. Of course nothing can be more round than a circle, nonetheless a circle, even the greatest possible circle, can be joined by a lesser circle thereby increasing the amount of circularity in existence. But if the lesser circle was derived from the pattern of the greater, then its roundness was merely an extension of the roundness of the original.

What if: God is the greatest possible good only while nothing else existed. Having created the world, (not out of necessity) it too is good (with qualifications). God is still the greatest possible good in terms of essentiality and nature, the good of creation created more good in terms of quantity but not essence- thereby God created more good because it is derivative of his own goodness. Or it may be more correct to say- in that God created the universe, all the good therein comes from him anyway therefore he is still the greatest possible good.

"there are no limits to what an omnipotent being can do." There are limits to what God can do, like making square circles, and sense out of non-sence.

Implications from Free Will on the Doctrine of Omnipotence:Why Arminians should agree with Calvin


I have taken the liberty of copying an excerpt of a discussion between Randal and myself (Kerry) From his Blog (found here) on the issue of Limited Atonement. This discussion has generated some interest (as it should) by others. In the interest of simplicity (maybe some selfishness) I have included here only what Randall has proposed and the discussion arising between him and I. I mean no disrespect to the contributions of other readers and ask that any readers here pay their respects to other contributions by going directly to his Blog, it just gets very convoluted with all the other comments. As far as I can see the discussion is still live and therefore I may add other comments and contributions as they occur. I hope in the copy and pasting I have not inadvertently left out any of the points between us, if that is the case please point that out and I will address it. The discussion is opened by Randal: 





Over the years as I have engaged in extended discussions with Calvinists over election and the divine nature I have often found the same two red herrings being pulled out just as things start to heat up.


And so it is in my recent discussion with a Calvinist named Kerry over my critique of another Calvinist (Andrew). Given that I think the discussion is illuminating I have reproduced it below with some commentary. Then I conclude by returning to the first red herring (justice). The drift of my argument shall be this: demonstrate why Calvinists should either be universalists or Arminians.


Red Herring One: Appeal to God’s Justice


The first red herring is God’s justice. Kerry, would you please speak clearly into the microphone:


Kerry: “It seems to me you are measuring God’s love on the basis of his actions towards people without any other consideration. What I mean is God does not just love people in isolation. He loves justice as well. Your maximally loving God must also consider justice.”


Randal enter from stage right. Turn the spotlight. And go:


Randal: “Kerry, I’m not sure what you’re claiming here. Are you saying that God was unablejustly to elect all people to salvation from eternity in Christ? If you do believe that, what is your reason for believing it? If you don’t believe it (and thus believe that God could have justly elected all to salvation), then why didn’t God elect all people to salvation from eternity in Christ?”


Kerry: “What I am asking- is your definition and measure of maximal love accurate? If God is love then whatever he does proceeds on the basis of love. God loves justice so some are justly condemned that is also a measure of his love, it is just that in this case his love is expressed in justice while sometimes it is expressed in mercy. God is no less loving either way and the integrity of his love for both justice and mercy are met perfectly on the cross.”


Randal: “Kerry, are you suggesting that God wouldn’t have been just if he had elected all to salvation by imputing the righteousness of Christ to all? After all, whether God reprobate some or saves all, his wrath and justice are still satisfied on penal substitutionary theology by the death of Christ. So the only remaining question is how many people would God will to save by the infinitely effective death of his beloved Son. If God is omnibenevolent (meaning that he desires all creatures to achieve shalom) then it follows necessarily that he would desire that all achieve shalom and thus he would elect all in Christ such that none would be reprobate. Insofar as you deny that this is the case and continue to affirm that some are reprobate you thereby reject the divine omnibenevolence. The question is why?”


So the defense of the decree of reprobation by appealing to justice is shown to be the red herring that it is. Time to introduce the next red herring.


Red Herring Two: Eschew “Speculation”


This brings us to the second red herring a heady brew of ”Who are you, O man, to talk back to God?” (Romans 9:20) spiced with a dash of “As the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways and my thoughts than your thoughts.” (Isaiah 55:9) Kerry once again:


Kerry: “Ultimately I don’t have to suggest anything about a hypothetical world. This is the one I live in- and I seek to understand it in terms of experience and in the light of scripture. It is apparent that people reject the Gospel, some accept it. Choices have consequences. I seek to understand this world through the lens of scripture, if I were to be more convinced that libertarian free will reflected scripture better I would follow that. I think that what is damaging is the extremism of both sides. We have a will, it is meaningful- but not absolute.”


Okay, turn up the house lights. Now for some additional commentary on this second red herring in the exchange. This one is centered on Kerry’s reply to the dilemma I presented for his invocation of justice. As we saw, he replies: “I don’t have to suggest anything about a hypothetical world.”


This is an attempt to marginalize my critique of his position as being unduly speculative (perhaps irreverent) and altogether irrelevant.


But it isn’t irrelevant. If Kerry wants to defend his Calvinism he does have to respond to this problem that his position entails that God cannot elect all to salvation. Why can’t God do this? I already showed that appealing to justice is a canard. So what is Kerry’s reasoning for thinking God cannot redeem all?


Consider for a moment that Kerry staked his claim on the position of christological peccability meaning that while Jesus didn’t sin he nonetheless could have. I would respond as follows: “Are you saying that God can sin?” It would hardly do for Kerry to respond “I don’t have to suggest anything about a hypothetical world.” Of course you do. If your view entails that God can sin then you have to defend that implication. Similarly, if your position entails that God cannot elect all to salvation then you have to defend that implication as well.


Back to justice


Ultimately the defense of Kerry’s assumption that God cannot elect all will bring us back to justice, but not in the way Kerry initially thought. At this point I’m going to offer clarification on how a Calvinist might appeal to justice to explain reprobation and why I am not persuaded by that appeal.


First off, I already explained why explaining the divine decree of reprobation by appealing to justicesimpliciter does not work. The reason, as I said, is that Christ’s death satisfies the divine justice (according to the penal substitutionary theory of atonement typically assumed by the good Calvinist). Consequently, to appeal to justice as the explanation of reprobation makes no sense. It is akin to a police officer attempting to explain his use of a lethal gun to detain a suspect when he could have used a non-lethal taser to the same effect.


The only way the Calvinist can appeal to justice is if there is something overall better or more fitting about the damnation of some. But what does that mean and what would it look like? What I suggest is that the Calvinist switch the focus from justice simpliciter to the demonstration of justice. To make the difference clear we can distinguish two different principles:


Justice reprobation (JR) principle: God’s justice precludes him from electing all to salvation.


Demonstration of justice reprobation (DJR) principle: God’s need to demonstratehis justice precludes him from electing all to salvation.


Keryr initially appealed to the JR Principle. I’m arguing that the Calvinist cannot appeal to the JR principle to explain reprobation since Christ’s death satisfies divine justice. However, they could appeal to the DJR principle. That is, they could argue that God’s need to demonstrate his justice in a maximal sense requires that some people be reprobated. One could argue that the DJR Principle is assumed in Romans 9:22-23:


What if God, although choosing to show his wrath and make his power known, bore with great patience the objects of his wrath—prepared for destruction? What if he did this to make the riches of his glory known to the objects of his mercy, whom he prepared in advance for glory


Thus the claim goes like this: Paul is arguing that the reprobation of some manifests more fully God’s glorious justice than it would have been manifested if none had been reprobated. Thus, God reprobates some not because justice requires it but rather because his need to demonstrate his justice as fully as possible requires it.


Now why am I not persuaded by the DJR Principle? Here’s why:


Fuller Justice (FJ) Assumption: The DJR Principle assumes that the death of Christ plus the reprobation of some more fully manifests God’s justice than the death of Christ alone.


But why think that? As best I can surmise, the assumption that drives the FJ Assumption is a Diversity of Justice Principle. We can state this as follows:


Diversity of Justice (DJ) Principle: Divine justice is more fully appreciable by finite agents if that justice is manifested in the election of some in Christ and the reprobation of others to their sin.


Finally, I’m going to complete this depth analysis by suggesting that the DJ Principle is driven by a contrasting justice principle:


Contrasting Justice (CJ) Principle: Divine justice is more fully appreciable by finite agents if that justice is manifested in contrasting outcomes which are all consistent with divine justice.


I know what you’re thinking: this is getting a bit ridiculous. Perhaps. But I’m in the mood for over-analysis and the positing of principles today. Anyway, it seems there is some accuracy in this analysis. So to summarize, the CJ Principle grounds the DJ Principle which in turn grounds the FJ Assumption that drives the DJR Principle.


All this leads me to ask the following three questions.


Question 1: Assuming the CJ Principle and DJ Principle are true, is the additional understanding of divine justice through the reprobation of some sufficient to override the divine love that would otherwise redeem all?


In other words, while God may desire to manifest his justice to finite creatures, he also desires to redeem creatures. Why think the desire to manifest his justice to some would outweigh his desire to save all?


Question 2: Assuming the CJ Principle and DJ Principle are true, is the additional understanding of divine justice through the reprobation of some sufficient to override the additional understanding of divine love that would come through the redemption of all?


It seems to me that if there is an argument that human beings have a heightened sense of divine justice through the reprobation of some, they would have at least a commensurately heightened grasp of divine love through the election of all. So if God has two possible conflicting outcomes (greater sense of divine justice; greater sense of divine love) why think the grasp of justice trumps love?


As important as these two questions are, I’m going to focus on Question 3:


Question 3: Why think that the CJ Principle and DJ Principle are true?


I see no reason to accept these, unless of course you believe that they are somehow entailed by your reading of Romans 9. But that is, to say the least, a leap. And if we have good reasons to reconsider a particular exegesis of a text then we ought to take those reasons seriously. So in conclusion I’m going to offer just such a reason.


Let’s imagine that only 1000 people have ever existed. (That’s okay. The numbers are irrelevant to the point being made. Sticking to a thousand just makes things simpler.) This means that only 1000 people are possible objects of election or reprobation. The Calvinist believes that things work out approximately like this:


Calvinist Scenario: God elects 500 (more or less) and reprobates 500 (more or less) because this more fully manifests his justice than does saving all 1000.


But hold on. There is a serious problem with this analysis and it is that the manifestation of justice that comes through election and reprobation is radically disproportionate. Here’s why:


An elect individual has the full righteousness of Christ imputed to him or her. Christ has fully satisfied the wrath and justice of God on the cross and since that elect individual is counted in Christ that individual is a complete token of that infinite justice.


By contrast,


A reprobate individual must suffer eternally to satisfy the demands of justice apart from the imputed righteousness of Christ. Since it is impossible to traverse an actual infinite series of temporal moments it is impossible for this reprobate individual ever to satisfy fully the demands of divine justice and thereby become a complete token of that infinite justice.


To sum up, the Calvinist is proposing that a possible world in which divine justice is perfectly satisfied in some and only potentially satisfied in others is more illustrative of divine justice than a world in which divine justice is perfectly satisfied in all. But this is clearly false. To provide an analogy, that is like claiming that 500 infinite deposits into a bank account coupled with 500 finite deposits is worth more than 1000 infinite deposits.


Consequently, the consistent Calvinist will either embrace universal salvation or reject Calvinist election.


Q.E.D.


1.


Kerry says:
Wednesday, November 16, 2011 at 10:00pm


Randal the red herring thing, is that what you really think? If so that would be the first time that I’m aware of that justice should be excluded as a consideration when talking of the measure of God’s love, salvation and election. I thought we needed saving because he is a God of justice. I thought it was a reasonable statement to say that our overall view of God’s love must include and be tempered by his love of justice. You no doubt have heard the saying “justice must not only be done, it must be seen to be done”. It looks like that with Pharoah doesn’t it?
But then I see further down you have already anticipated that.


“Kerry, I’m not sure what you’re claiming here.” Really Randal, in your focused rebuttal you just finished saying you have spoken with Calvinists over the years and they always bring up this red herring? You knew exactly what I was claiming. Perhaps the red herring was put there by you for bait?


“This is an attempt to marginalize my critique of his position as being unduly speculative (perhaps irreverent) and altogether irrelevant”.


This talk of red herrings makes it sound as if I was deliberately obfuscating the issue. You pour scorn on the idea of bringing justice into the question and then bring my motives into question. Was that really necessary; is your argument so weak?
But enough tattle.


You say you “already showed that appealing to justice is a canard.” *, no you have told us it is; I have yet to see it demonstrated either philosophically or scripturally.


Are you saying that God was unable justly to elect all people to salvation from eternity in Christ? If you do believe that, what is your reason for believing it?


I am not saying God was unable, what I am saying is that He chooses not to, and I cite Pharaoh as a case in point.


You have not answered my question: “What I am asking- is your definition and measure of maximal love accurate?” Does maximal love mandate that not a single one need answer for the evil they have committed? Please explain.


If the definition of “maximal love” need not consider justice then wouldn’t maximal love have created an amoral universe? But that is clearly impossible since love cannot be comprehended in an amoral universe; our consciousness is given us as a reflection of being made in God’s image- love is our privilege to know but with it comes the correlatives of evil, justice and mercy.
How God weighs up what is “maximal love” is a mystery to me. Evidently it necessitated evil coming into the world, justice is an empty meaningless term without evil, and so is mercy. We have a moral universe, evil exists, God had pre-empted the incursion of evil with the lamb that was slain from the foundation of the world.


You may make talk of electing all but that negates the idea of electing or choosing (like talk of making square circles): Every act of will is an act of self-limitation. To desire action is to desire limitation. In that sense every act is an act of self-sacrifice. When you choose anything, you reject everything else. G.K. Chesterton “Orthodoxy”. By that standard if you posit that God elects all then you destroy the idea of election. He would have then simply said- “all are saved”, there would then be no more talk of election. Inherent in the idea of “election” (choice) is selection, distinction, separation. They are necessary corollaries to the word. The reality is God speaks of “election” you have to do something with the word without destroying its meaning.


Jesus said: Woe unto the world because of offences! for it must needs be that offences come; but woe to that man by whom the offence cometh! (Matthew 18:7)


I take it that the mystery of evil (for all it’s abhorrence) is a necessary evil, and that a “maximally loving” God is just that, not despite the evil but through it. The reformed view acknowledges human responsibility and culpability.


So what is Kerry’s reasoning for thinking God cannot redeem all?
I have made no statement at all about whether God can or cannot redeem all. As far as I can see He chooses not to save all and God being the maximally perfect being has made the best world possible. This also includes the fact that he chooses to “knock some off their high horse” (St Paul) while he continues to let others ride on blissfully unaware through self delusion.


I am not saying that God is unable justly to elect all people to salvation from eternity in Christ; on the other hand are you saying that God (because of libertarian freewill) cannot save whom he chooses from all eternity? Is God free? Are we more free than God? If God is not the referent for freedom then must we look to ourselves?


I have no doubt that whatever moral obligations or duties God may have (obligations or duties which are rooted in the necessity of his own nature) he has met.


Well we can surely agree on that.


If you don’t believe it (and thus believe that God could have justly elected all to salvation), then why didn’t God elect all people to salvation from eternity in Christ?”


Randal you are attempting to put me on the horns of a dilemma but I suspect the dilemma is yours. I neither confirm nor deny the possibility of God justly electing all people to salvation from eternity in Christ. This reminds me somewhat of the cosmological argument. In days gone by it was thought the universe was infinite and eternal and thus neatly dispensed of a need for a creator. Then there was a big bang and suddenly a creator is looming on the horizon again. Now we have to think of multiverses (for which there is no evidence) in order to find yet another excuse for denying a creator. Why can’t we stick with the world we do have?


*Wow! Canard I confess I had to look that one up… I can ’ardly wait to see what comes next… canard: a false or baseless, usually derogatory story, report, or rumor. Dictionary .com


I didn’t know Calvinism had sunk this low.


o Reply


randal says:
Wednesday, November 16, 2011 at 11:38pm


“I thought it was a reasonable statement to say that our overall view of God’s love must include and be tempered by his love of justice.”


This is completely ignoring my point. His love of justice is already manifested in the penal substitionary death of Christ.


“You no doubt have heard the saying “justice must not only be done, it must be seen to be done”.”


It was seen to be done. Look to the cross Kerry!


“This talk of red herrings makes it sound as if I was deliberately obfuscating the issue.”


That’s not my intention. I think the points are a distraction from the main issues, but I don’t think you’re trying to direct us away from the main issues. I could have said “rabbit trail” perhaps but that lacks bite.


“I am not saying God was unable [to elect all people], what I am saying is that He chooses not to.”


As you know, there are several texts in scripture that are interpreted by universalists (Calvinists among them) to suggest otherwise. At least their view is coherent. Why is it, on your view, that God, the God who is supposed to be infinitely more loving and compassionate than any human being ever could be, chooses not to?


“Does maximal love mandate that not a single one need answer for the evil they have committed? Please explain.”


I already defined love: to love another is to desire that the other achieve shalom. To love maximally is, minimally to desire that all achieve shalom. How do you define maximal love?


“To desire action is to desire limitation. In that sense every act is an act of self-sacrifice. When you choose anything, you reject everything else.”


Sure. So by electing to save all God would have given up the option fo electing to save only some.


“The reality is God speaks of “election” you have to do something with the word without destroying its meaning.”


You’re playing a semantic card? Insofar as we understand “election” as chosen for salvation it is perfectly meaningful to ask how many (and possibly all) are elect to salvation.


“I have made no statement at all about whether God can or cannot redeem all. As far as I can see He chooses not to save all and God being the maximally perfect being has made the best world possible.”


If God chooses not to save all then God could have saved all. As for “best world possible”, I think that’s an incoherent concept like “highest number”. God could always create a world with a few more daffodils and gum drops.


“I neither confirm nor deny the possibility of God justly electing all people to salvation from eternity in Christ.”


Read over the comments you made that I quoted above. Twice you actually said (the first time explicitly) that Christ could have elected all to salvation but chose not to. So then if you believe God is omnibenevolent or perfectly good you need to explain why this is. If you have a child contemplate that child suffering forever the most unspeakable torments for the glory of God and his saints. Does that make any sense to you?


2. Reply


Kerry says:
Thursday, November 17, 2011 at 1:10am


“A reprobate individual must suffer eternally to satisfy the demands of justice apart from the imputed righteousness of Christ. Since it is impossible to traverse an actual infinite series of temporal moments it is impossible for this reprobate individual ever to satisfy fully the demands of divine justice and thereby become a complete token of that infinite justice.”


By this stroke of genius you have not only robbed God of exacting justice, you have robbed anyone of “eternal life”. Why stop there! God himself (whom I believed to be eternal) mustn’t exist either by your definition.


Quite Easily Done


Reply


o


randal says:
Thursday, November 17, 2011 at 10:47pm


“By this stroke of genius you have not only robbed God of exacting justice, you have robbed anyone of “eternal life”. ”


Kerry, I don’t think you’re understanding the point. Let’s assume that eternal conscious torment is just. On the Arminian view God allows those who freely reject him to suffer eternally because they will not choose otherwise and he respects their choice. That is, on this view, a fully just response to hell.


But things are very different for the Calvinist. On his view God could have willed that an individual freely repent and become a token instance of the imputed righteousness of Christ. But instead, God chooses to make that individual reject Christ’s righteousness and become a token example of an individual suffering finitely and in perpetuity for sins committed. In other words, God has inexplicably chosen a less complete means to exemplify divine justice.


So Calvinism has a problem here not faced by Arminianism and certainly not by eternal conscious torment per se.


Reply


§


Kerry says:
Friday, November 18, 2011 at 3:59am


“On the Arminian view God allows those who freely reject him to suffer eternally because they will not choose otherwise and he respects their choice.”


You may claim that as an exclusive Arminian view but isn’t that the Calvinist position also?


“On his view God could have willed that an individual freely repent and become a token instance of the imputed righteousness of Christ. But instead, God chooses to make that individual reject Christ’s righteousness and become a token example of an individual suffering finitely and in perpetuity for sins committed.”


No I disagree, on the point that- “God chooses to make that individual reject Christ” as before- that person freely rejects him and God chooses to allow that to happen. In the elect God chooses to make the Gospel real enough to one’s heart that she accepts it. Isn’t that what grace is all about? Where Randal is your idea of grace? We acknowledge not only the sacrifice of Christ but the work of grace in the heart.


You haven’t answered my incredulity:


I may be thick as a plank but where do you get the idea to equate eternal with it is impossible to traverse an actual infinite series of temporal moments it is impossible for this reprobate individual ever to satisfy fully the demands of divine justice A reference like that pertains to time- we are talking outside the time/space realm are we not?


I am not committed to any particular view of existence for the unregenerate after death.


Reply


§


randal says:
Friday, November 18, 2011 at 5:21am


“You may claim that as an exclusive Arminian view but isn’t that the Calvinist position also?”


I think it is very misleading for a Calvinist to say that God respects the choice a person makes since that would naturally be read as implying libertarianism.


“No I disagree, on the point that- “God chooses to make that individual reject Christ” as before- that person freely rejects him and God chooses to allow that to happen. In the elect God chooses to make the Gospel real enough to one’s heart that she accepts it.”


Your statement, particularly the last bit, is sufficiently unclear that it would be consistent with Arminianism. I am not sure how you’re understanding Calvinism Kerry. Put very simply, on Calvinism God’s decree is the ontological ground of election while on Arminianism God’s foreknowledge of human choice is the ontological ground of election. So I provided a correct description of the Calvinist position.


“Where Randal is your idea of grace?”


Grace is unmerited favor and it is found in God’s creating and redeeming actions, above all in Christ.


“A reference like that pertains to time- we are talking outside the time/space realm are we not?”


No we are not. Where did you get the idea that eternity is atemporal? Boethius? Even if you think divine eternity is atemporal that doesn’t mean human resurrection eternity is atemporal. We are embodied beings who will live in a temporal, redeemed heaven and earth. That’s the biblical view. It sounds like you drank a little too much of Plato’s punch at the reception. You know that stuff is spiked with bad metaphysics and will give you a wicked hangover.


Reply


§


Kerry says:
Friday, November 18, 2011 at 9:19am


on Arminianism God’s foreknowledge of human choice is the ontological ground of election.


Isn’t that really saying God saw in the future that we would choose Christ, so God chose us on the basis of that? Which means what you chose and what I chose is really ultimate. And God ratifies our choice- his election of us becomes in effect a contingent cause. Here again this view denies the omnipotence and sovereignty of God not to mention the initiation of our faith. In my book- God is the author and finisher of our faith.


Does God direct History from the perspective of eternity? That is to say does he bring to pass events, and more specifically, move people, heaven and earth to orchestrate those events according to a plan that he purposed before the foundation of the world? Or does God merely report back from the future to his prophets like a roving journalist sourcing newsworthy stories that will give him a greater circulation? I mean doesn’t it strike you as being just the teeniest egotistical to be in the pole position?


Human freedom is real enough to make us responsible for our decisions and yet not so ultimate that God needs our permission to move our wills. Human autonomy must also be real enough for it to be truly possible to “love the LORD your God with all your heart and with all your soul.” A love that was not spontaneous is not love at all- but here it must be stressed- that the love with which we love God is a derived love, not- in the purest sense- a native of human origins.


Reply


§


randal says:
Friday, November 18, 2011 at 5:21pm


“Isn’t that really saying God saw in the future that we would choose Christ, so God chose us on the basis of that?”


Exactly.


“Which means what you chose and what I chose is really ultimate.”


It depends what you mean by “ultimate”. We are only saved because prevenient grace has enlivened the fallen human sufficiently to be able to choose the salvation freely offered in Christ.


“I mean doesn’t it strike you as being just the teeniest egotistical to be in the pole position?”


God created everything from an infinite number of possibilities with full knowledge of every event that would occur. He upholds it all in existence every moment. And he will bring the entire state of current affairs — everything in heaven and on earth — to reconcilation in Christ (Col. 1:20). And you think that means that we’re in the pole position?


Reply


§


Kerry says:
Friday, November 18, 2011 at 10:15pm


I said “Isn’t that really saying God saw in the future that we would choose Christ, so God chose us on the basis of that?”
You (Randal) said “Exactly.”
What do you do with Paul’s anticipation of that very issue with regard to election?
(For the children being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works, but of him that calleth;)(Romans 9:11)
You have said that our act of believing is the basis on which God elects us; whereas Paul affirms election stands not only prior to any acts on our part, but irrespective of any acts on our part. That must include any act foreseen by God. This follows by what he says shortly after: So then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy.(Romans 9:16) That is not to say “irrespective” means that we need not believe, but that election is the determining factor.


“We are only saved because prevenient grace has enlivened the fallen human sufficiently to be able to choose the salvation freely offered in Christ”.


Prevenient grace: prevenient grace allows persons to engage their God-given free will to choose the salvation offered by God in Jesus Christ or to reject that salvific offer. (Wikipedia)


On that view God’s election can only stand subordinate to human will- that is patently not what Paul intends. God did not merely offer salvation to an entire humanity that was fallen in trespasses in sins and effectively dead to the call of the Gospel. What God did was to mandate to Jesus the Christ the power to give eternal life not, just proffer eternal life. If eternal life was merely presented to the fallen and capricious nature of mankind then it destroys the basis on which we are to look forward to the promise you referred to: “And he will bring the entire state of current affairs — everything in heaven and on earth — to reconcilation in Christ (Col. 1:20).”
(John 17:2) As thou hast given him power over all flesh, that he should give eternal life to as many as thou hast given him I have written a piece which you can find here:http://struth-his-or-yours.blogspot.com/2009/08/power-over-all-flesh.html And I would value your comment.


“It depends what you mean by “ultimate”.” Come, come now, you know that what I mean is that on the Arminian position the last and final say as to whether one is saved is dependent on human will not divine will.


“And you think that means that we’re in the pole position?” You know, or at least ought to, that I refer to this supposed superior position of Arminians with regard to the human will and salvation.


“And he will bring the entire state of current affairs — everything in heaven and on earth — to reconcilation in Christ (Col. 1:20).”


I think that really is the point of Calvinism. Arminians concede this promise with lip service but deny Gods ability to achieve it through their system of theology which leaves election to chance and the capriciousness and ultimacy of human will. We know a house divided against itself cannot stand, Arminianism presents a view of human nature which if it were true would deny the power of God to fulfill any of those promises in any absolute sense.


You have certainly shaken my tree as regards to some issues peripheral to this one but I remain at this point committed to the view I have tried to demonstrate.


Reply


§


Kerry says:
November 18th, 2011 at 10:28pm


So it is misleading because a Calvinist might agree with an Arminian on some issue? The hard Arminian errs because he makes the human will ultimate on the issue of salvation. My view of Calvinism is that when God sovereignly chooses (as in the elect) the extent of his revelation to that individual is enough to make his grace irresistible. Just as in the case of the ordinary course of nature God may choose to bring a miracle which by definition is a suspension of the laws of nature.


If I might make a distillation of your argument against limited atonement. Do I understand correctly that you posit that a “maximally loving” God cannot but help saving all (if possible) since that is what He is by nature? He is not free to choose to elect only some (you say) otherwise it effectively makes the Calvinist God a lesser God with regard to love. I find that interesting because that is essentially my beef with the Arminian God. On that view the Arminian makes a lesser God (I say) with respect to his power. The Arminian God voluntarily, by an act of will withstands or negates to some degree what He is necessarily by nature (omnipotent); something you say that (in the case of love) he cannot or ought not to do.


3. Reply


Kerry says:
Thursday, November 17, 2011 at 8:33pm


“Why is it, on your view, that God, the God who is supposed to be infinitely more loving and compassionate than any human being ever could be, chooses not to?”


The answer to that is that he is not only infinitely more loving he is also infinitely more wise and therefore he chooses (as far as I am able to see) not to give the gift of eternal life to all.
There is a problem with your view of God and I have been wracking my little brain to see what it is. Under your scheme God is bound by love to save all, where then is there room for grace? You would turn “amazing” grace into something obligatory, grace then is no longer grace.
You make God subject to a law of love in order to bind him to saving all. You think that it is expedient for God to be reduced to a being with no free will in order that you may keep your perception of human free will. You actually believe that because God can do no wrong humanity is more free than God! You seek to use the love of God as a means by which to bind Him in order to preserve your own sense of freedom. When it comes to love- God must be a maximally loving God who cannot but be bound by that nature and therefore elect all justly. You maintain that freewill entails that we must be free to choose either good or evil and you see that as a higher good. Therefore the ridiculous consequence (from that thinking) follows that humans are more free than God! I cannot (for what it’s worth) agree with this. How can we be more free than God? But that is the necessary consequence of thinking that way. It is a contradiction in terms to think of freedom in the context of a nature bound to sin.


This whole warped idea of freedom arises by believing that “free will” (as assumed and defined by the libertarian) is the highest good. People think that the ability to do evil shows freedom, it is not, it is the result of bondage. He is most free who is bound by a good nature to do no evil. This must be so; he is most bound who is, by an evil nature, free to do no good.

Unfortunately by this point the juggernaut has moved on, Randall has stopped responding to me (at least at this time) Which is really a pity because I managed to get a bit more formal in my argument and believe it puts Randal on the horns of a dilemma. But you be the judge of that, here is my last comment:



 Randal said: “If God is omnibenevolent (meaning that he desires all creatures to achieve shalom) then it follows necessarily that he would desire that all achieve shalom and thus he would elect all in Christ such that none would be reprobate. Insofar as you deny that this is the case and continue to affirm that some are reprobate you thereby reject the divine omnibenevolence. The question is why?” 

The strength of Randal’s argument lies in the apparent obligation of God to save all based on God’s omnibenevolent nature. Randal says: “it follows necessarily that he would desire that all achieve shalom and thus he would elect all in Christ”. In other words because he is omnibenevolent by nature then he cannot but act according to that nature.

G.K Chesterton in his book Orthodoxy said: “Do not free a camel of the burden of his hump: you may be freeing him from being a camel. The moment you step into the world of facts, you step into a world of limits. You can free things from alien or accidental laws, but not from the laws of their own nature.”  .

I will try to be more formal with the proposition.

“A house divided against itself cannot stand” therefore in a perfect nature one facet of that nature cannot militate against another. His omnibenevolence is in harmony with his omnipotence.

This is how it is for the Arminian:

God is omnibenevolent by nature.

The laws of his own nature preclude God from choosing anything that would violate that nature.

Therefore “he would elect all in Christ such that none would be reprobate.”

Now let’s see how it is for the Calvinist:

God is omnipotent by nature.

The laws of his own nature preclude God from choosing anything that would violate that nature.

Therefore he would elect to create a being that could not violate his nature. Libertarian freewill does not exist.

If we concede a limitation in the nature of God with respect to power (so that men are able to refuse God) then it legitimately follows that:

we may concede a limitation in the nature of God with respect to love (so that God is able to refuse men)

If there are good grounds (like sin) to refuse men then God need not save all.

Mankind has a will – being made in the image of God we concede

God has a will.

Man’s nature is imperfect- he is a creature subject to space and time with finite knowledge and limited power, therefore his will is imperfect (not to mention the fall)

God’s nature is perfect- he is not subject to his own nature in the same way we are because he is the ground of those perfections therefore his will his power and love is perfect.


It hardly needs saying that if God is bound by omnibenevolence to save all, then he would be equally bound by omnipotence to create that which was unable to violate his power.
On the other hand if we see a concession of his power is made on behalf of mankind such that they could resist his will, then we must see that a concession would exist with respect to his benevolence thus he could refuse to save some. 





























Reply